



BEDFORD POLICE STATION

FACILITY EVALUATION

The heart and soul of a community is embodied in and reflected by the services provided to its residents and visitors as well as the facilities from which, those services are provided. The facility itself communicates to the residents as much as the employees who protect and serve in them.

A police station is the outward manifestation of the community's commitment to public safety as well as the outward projection of the police department's philosophy and vision. The building transcends the simple "brick and mortar" elements that encapsulates offices and rooms; it communicates the spirit of the community and the department's orientation toward its mission. Moreover, it communicates to the employees who "live" in the station inasmuch as it communicates the community's commitment to the employees, their mission and safety.

To those in law enforcement the police station, often referred to as "the house" is where many of us spend most of our working careers. It is the central "hub" that provides not only the necessities to fulfill the department's mission, it becomes the focal point for professional relationships as well as the location for bonding with colleagues; finding a moment's respite from a difficult call or case or an inviting and comfortable place to engage with our residents or offer them moments of respite in the midst of personal tragedy or crisis. Unlike other municipal services with the notable exception of the Fire Department, the Police Station is a 24/7/365 operation all day, all night, every day and night all year long; rain or shine, it's the beacon of safety for the community.

A police station that fulfills the community's needs as well as the needs of the employees who work there is much more than brick, mortar, stone and steel; it must project the professionalism, openness, comforting, caring and devotion to public safety and public service of the agency. The facility must meet the community's needs as much as the department's and employee's needs.

The keystone element that underpins the philosophy, mission and vision of the Bedford Police Department is ***community policing and community engagement***. As we know, our current facility does not project the spirit of the community or the Department and fails to meet community needs beyond the "brick and mortar" meeting space it provides. It is neither inviting nor does it offer the comfort and inviting nature of the community and agency. It is not equipped to provide the comfort and amenities required for our citizens and especially our victims and their families and loved ones. It fails to provide the basic necessities to function efficiently and effectively and we are unable

to comply with several Federal, state and national accreditation standards. We are unable to offer private and comfortable meeting space to address citizen's in need and crisis nor can it offer the amenities necessary for our employees to be as efficient and effective as they could or enjoy a pleasurable work environment and experience.

This summary report and images of the current station provides only an overview, but as you absorb the data and images, keep in mind the need for our station to “communicate” with the residents, our victims and their loved ones and our employees. It also contains the background, findings and deficiencies that underscore the critical need to move the Bedford Police Department into a facility that meets community and agency needs while correcting both *operational* and *functional* deficiencies that compromise the delivery of efficient and effective police and public safety services in the Town of Bedford.

I. Current Facility Background: The current police station at 55 Constitution Drive was originally designed as general office space for an insurance company until it was purchased by the Town in 1994 and retrofitted to accommodate public safety services. In 1994, the Department *staffing* was approximately *one-half* of our current authorized sworn member staff of 40 and total staffing of 55 employees. In 1994, the *population* of Bedford was approximately 12,500 or about *one-half* of our current population. The space occupied by the Department in 1994 at 55 Constitution Drive was *barely* adequate in 1994 at approximately 8,000 square feet (sq. ft.). In other words, the Department moved into its current space in 1994 at or very near capacity with no provision for expansion. Through successive “re-fits” and changes necessitated by the growth of the Department, which expanded to meet the increased public safety needs of a growing suburban community, the current facility, never designed or built as a police station, quickly became inadequate. Over the intervening decades inadequacy led to critical operational and functional deficiencies that fail to meet both community and Department needs.

It is important to recognize and memorialize the fact that 55 Constitution Drive *barely met* the Department's *needs* in 1994 when the building was modified to operate and accommodate law enforcement functions. *The building at 55 Constitution was never designed to serve law enforcement functions and the resultant modifications to accommodate law enforcement and the Department were undertaken without aforethought for growth or consistent with law enforcement facility planning best practices.*

Over the intervening 26-years since initial occupancy, the Department more than doubled in size and despite several modifications, many completed by Department staff themselves, ultimately failed to correct or even mitigate several major structural design flaws that would, if undertaken, necessitate extensive modification and be cost ineffective. During that same timeframe, several inspections and studies, some completed by architectural firms, all determined the Police Department was operating in approximately *one-half the space necessary.* The most *recent study found the Department occupies 8,942 sq. ft. of interior space; however, a MINIMUM, 16,592 sq. ft. of interior space is required* to accommodate a law enforcement agency our size. This equates to a *deficit of 7,650 sq. ft. not accounting for growth.* The architectural firm that developed the interior space requirement of *16,592 sq. ft.* based their finding on *industry accepted average space utilization standards* for law enforcement agencies.

II. Operational Deficiencies:

A. Functional Layout/Design: As noted above, 55 Constitution was *never designed or intended to be used as a police station*; therefore, several design deficiencies are inherent in the current structure and would be *cost prohibitive* to correct.

1. Booking/Detention Facility: The booking/detention facility is the location where subjects under arrest are “processed” (fingerprinted, photographed, documented).

- Male/Female Separation: The booking/detention facility ***does not meet Federal and state standards*** for temporary detention/custody of males, females and juveniles. The facility is “unisex” in that there are no ***separate*** holding/detention facilities for males and females.
- Juvenile Separation: We have no secure facility to detain and process juvenile subjects in custody, which *must be segregated from adults*.
- Interview/Interrogation (Adult): There is no secure facility within the booking/detention facility to interview or interrogate subjects in custody. Currently, the subjects are either interviewed in the booking/detention facility, which is not equipped or designed for such a process or the subject in custody must be *moved while in custody to an interview room elsewhere in the station*. Moving subjects in custody within the station is inherently *unsafe* and poses additional risk to the officer(s) who have the subject in custody as well as *civilian* staff, the *public* and the subject in custody. There are *many cases* in which subjects in custody take advantage of such movements outside a secure area to attempt to escape and/or attack officers. Currently, bail commissioners must be given access to the entire booking/detention facility to accommodate the bail process, which has led to allegations of loss/stolen funds due to the bail commissioner’s presence in the booking/detention facility where access to the subject’s personal property including cash is available. Subjects in custody wishing to speak privately with an attorney *compromises the safety of both the prisoner and attorney* as no secure facility within the secured detention area zone is available and accessible.
- Interview/Interrogation (Juvenile): There is no secure facility within the secured booking/detention “zone” separated from adults to interview juveniles (often with parent(s)/guardian(s) present). Currently, a uniformed officer is taken out of service to “guard” juveniles in an “interview room” because juveniles must not be secured in any area where adult subjects in custody are secured. Additionally, parent(s)/guardians and the juvenile subject must be allowed access to the secure area of the station in order to facilitate the interview of a juvenile.
- Evidence: Access to the Department’s evidence processing/holding facility is gained from the booking/detention facility. This *compromises* the integrity of our evidence collection/processing requirements inasmuch as evidence must be separate to ensure evidence collection/processing *integrity*. Officers and detectives with evidence must pass through booking/detention, sometimes while a subject is present/in-custody with evidence from a wholly independent case, to access and store evidence.

- Safety and Design: The current facility requires officers to move subjects under arrest, who oftentimes are unruly, belligerent or worse, to different locations in the facility for fingerprinting/images and personal history acquisition. The corridors, width and location introduce opportunities for injury for both officers and prisoners. Such facilities are designed to be open, accommodating and devoid of barriers that become dangerous obstacles when handling a belligerent subject.
 - Construction/Design: The cinderblock and steel construction of the current booking/detention facility makes any retrofit to correct the operational deficiencies above, *cost prohibitive*. Moreover, there is no available space to permit such a modification. The physical design/layout of the booking/detention facility *invites injury* to both prisoners and officers; beginning with a required “step up into” the facility from the sally port to the size, location and proximity of the intermediate secure (cage) area where prisoners are held while officers input personal history information into the Department’s records management system (RMS); this has led to injury to both prisoners and officers as well as damage to Department equipment as recent as 2019 when a prisoner in the “cage” damaged a Department computer/printer.
 - Accreditation Standards: The operational deficiencies noted above are inconsistent with national accreditation standards and cannot be corrected using the current facility as a starting point.
2. Interview/Interrogation Facilities: Interviews of victims/witnesses as well as interrogations of subjects suspected of a crime are inherent necessities of criminal investigation. Concomitant with these needs are the dual requirements to ensure the proper setting is provided especially for juveniles and victims as well as the requirement to ensure the integrity and security of the facility.
- Public Interview: There is no provision to conduct private interviews of citizens without breaching the security and integrity of the facility. A police station should have a private interview room(s) contiguous to the public lobby where private conversations between citizens, victims and witnesses can be conducted without breaching the security perimeter of the facility exposing sworn and civilian staff to individuals who have not been searched or deemed “secure.”
 - Patrol Operations Division Interview/Interrogation: The Patrol Operations Division has no designated interview/interrogation facility available. Only one room on the Patrol Operations side of the facility is available.
 - Juvenile Interview Facility: There is no facility available to interview juveniles and especially juvenile victims in the proper setting separate from adults or that is secure that would allow the officer or detective to leave the room temporarily without having to provide another officer/detective to maintain security.
 - Investigative Interview/Interrogations: In 2020 both under-sized and inadequate rooms used to interview/interrogate were equipped with the Department’s digital evidence solution that provides audio/video recording; however, both rooms are ill-designed and equipped to properly conduct interviews/interrogations and neither are within the secure detention facility.

- No Space Available: The current facility affords no available space to retrofit and build the required interview/interrogation facilities necessary to conduct proper investigations without compromising security and the integrity of the investigation. There is no “soft” interview room facility to properly accommodate victims of crime in an atmosphere that is comforting or inviting for someone to discuss difficult if not harrowing experiences with our officers and detectives.
 - The operational deficiencies caused by the current facility that adversely affect the Department’s Interview/Interrogation facilities significantly compromises the integrity, safety and security of sworn and civilian personnel as well as the public; the modifications required to correct the deficiencies identified above cannot be accomplished using the current facility.
3. Prisoner Containment/Sally Port: In order to ensure the security and protection of subjects in custody as well as the officers who have the subject in custody and other sworn and civilian staff a “sally port” or secure garage is necessary so an officer with a subject in custody can drive into the “sally port”, which is then secured to prevent escape. The “sally port” must be large enough to accommodate at least two (2) cruisers inasmuch as many occasions occur when there are multiple subjects under arrest from the same or different cases at the same time.
- Sally Port Size/Location: The current sally port is both too small and poorly located to provide adequate service and security. The current sally port can only accommodate one (1) cruiser at any given time, which results in other subjects under arrest being removed from a cruiser outside the sally port in the parking lot exposing a greater risk of escape and potential danger to sworn and civilian employees of the Police Department as well as other Town employees working from the Public Safety Complex. A properly constructed and located sally port allows multiple cruisers to drive in and then *through* the sally port.
 - Bulk Storage Contamination: A sally port must be “secure” inasmuch as any extraneous material, objects or items in the sally port can pose a risk to safety and security if the subject under arrest is able to escape hand restraints and attack an officer, which has happened in many localities; sometimes leading to tragedy. Our current sally port is also used for bulk storage of equipment and our police motorcycle. Even though fencing is provided to attempt to secure the facility, the lack of bulk storage compromises the security and safety of our current sally port facility.
 - Vehicle Evidence Processing: A sally port should be large enough to accommodate secure, climate controlled, evidence processing of motor vehicles while providing space to accommodate subjects under arrest. Our current facility is unable to provide neither secure vehicle processing nor simultaneous secure prisoner containment. If a vehicle is in the sally port pending the execution of a search warrant, any officer with a subject under arrest must take the prisoner out of the cruiser in the parking lot.
 - The operational deficiencies caused by the current facility that adversely affect the Department’s prisoner containment requirements significantly compromises the integrity, safety and security of both sworn and civilian personnel as well as the public

and those in our custody and must be corrected. Moreover, the modifications required to correct the deficiencies identified above cannot be made using the current facility as a starting point.

4. Evidence: The integrity, security and storage of evidence is essential to ensure successful prosecution of criminal matters. Sufficient space must be afforded for the separation of bulk evidence items from non-bulk items. Additionally, the storage of drug evidence must be segregated from other evidence in a facility that has proper air exchange to prevent contamination of the air quality and environment. The storage of US Currency must also be segregated from other evidence and there must be sufficient space to properly store and maintain the increasing number of firearms being stored as a result of investigations as well as protective orders. There must be a secure evidence processing area separate from evidence storage where officers/detectives can properly examine, document, package and process evidence.
 - Evidence Location: Currently, the Department's evidence facility is contiguous with the prisoner processing and detention facility, which is contrary to accreditation and best practices. It is inappropriate to introduce personnel into the detention facility while subjects are in custody for unrelated matters simply to process evidence. Moreover, the likelihood of contamination to evidence is substantially increased when evidence processing/storage is located contiguous with a detention facility. In order to achieve maximum human resource efficiency, the combined evidence facilities necessary for temporary, routine evidence, controlled drugs, cash, firearms, bulk evidence and impounded evidence must be *co-located and adjacent to and easily accessible for the personnel responsible for this program*. The Department's evidence program is within the responsibility of the Detective Division, whose members are located on the other side of the current facility, which reduces the efficiency and effectiveness of the program.
 - Evidence Storage Capacity: The Department's evidence facility is beyond capacity and fails to meet the accreditation standards necessary to segregate controlled substances, firearms and US Currency. The Department is considering repurposing one detention cell adjacent to evidence to expand the evidence facility, which is out of space.
 - Air Quality: The current evidence facility has minimal if any positive air exchange, therefore, the quality of air in evidence is contaminated by controlled substances, which poses a health risk to our employees.
 - Bulk Evidence Storage: The Department has *no* bulk evidence facility; all items of evidentiary value must be stored in the only evidence facility available, which as noted, is already beyond capacity. On occasion, bulk evidence has been stored outside the evidence facility, which compromises the integrity of evidence due to potential contamination. A bulk evidence storage facility must be located adjacent to the primary evidence storage facility to afford efficiency and effective time/motion for personnel processing evidence. Seized/recovered bicycles are stored with Department archives/records instead of a secure bulk evidence facility.
 - Evidence Processing: The current evidence processing area is very small and constrains the operations of officers involved in processing all forms of evidence. It

is not able to be audio/visual recorded which is essential for any evidence processing facility and must be large enough to contain refrigeration units to store evidence items subject to contamination unless refrigerated. The evidence processing area must have drop chutes that allow for processed evidence to be securely placed into the evidence facility at any time without breaching the facility. Currently, the Department has a limited number of evidence “lockers” which means evidence from separate cases are placed into temporary storage together, which is contrary to best practice.

- Climate Controlled: Evidence processing, and storage facility must be properly climate controlled for air quality as well as humidity, which affects the integrity of some items of evidence that contain body fluids, etc. Our evidence facility does not afford the proper air quality or climate controls necessary to ensure the integrity of any evidence including that with body fluids.
 - Forensic Examination Area: There is no area available for detectives to conduct physical examination and testing of evidentiary items in a secure space contiguous with evidence storage.
 - Refrigeration: The Department does not have proper (secure) refrigeration units designed to hold evidence that are accessible only by authorized personnel. While not necessarily a space/facility issue, there is insufficient space for proper evidence refrigeration units and no alternative space available.
 - Digital Evidence Storage: The Department has no secure area to temporarily process and preserve digital devices. Currently, digital devices, which should remain charged to preserve evidence, must be left unsecured in the evidence processing area, which compromises the integrity of the evidence that may be on the device.
 - Impounded Evidence: Items too large for bulk storage, typically automobiles, trucks, motorcycles, etc. must be stored in a secure area to prevent contamination and degradation of evidence. Moreover, the location of the secure impound facility should be contiguous with the police station to eliminate costly towing between impound and a facility where the item can be examined/searched by detectives. Currently, the impound facility for the Department *is not adequately secure*. The Department is and remains at risk for contaminated and degraded evidence stored in our non-secure area that subjects the items to the environment.
 - The operational deficiencies caused by the current facility that adversely affect the Department’s Evidence Program significantly compromises the integrity of our criminal investigations and must be corrected. Moreover, the modifications required to correct the deficiencies identified above simply cannot be made using the current facility unless there is a *commitment for major reconstruction and a substantial addition to the current facility footprint that is not available*. *Moving the Fire Department from the current facility to correct deficiencies in the police department is COST INEFFECTIVE due to the much higher cost of renovation as opposed to new construction.*
5. Integration of Operational Elements of the Department: In order to achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness of our most costly resource (personnel) it is imperative that operational elements of the Department are integrated. From a simple time and

motion/workflow perspective, the physical work processes conducted by operational elements of the Department (Patrol Operations Division and Detective Division), which comprises 90% of our total sworn staffing, must be integrated and co-located within the facility.

- The incorporation of workflow into facility design produces cost savings; alternatively, *significant synergy between operational elements is lost when they are physically separated as they currently are in the Bedford Police Station.*
 - The physical barrier between the Patrol Operations and Detective Division has caused significant disruption in our operational capabilities wherein close operational working relationships have never developed.
 - Despite significant effort from command staff, the physical barrier between Patrol Operations and Detectives exacerbated the gap between the divisions to the extent it became, over years, a chasm largely due to the physical barrier that exists.
 - The close working relationships and synergy that can produce higher quality investigations by both divisions is largely lost. Simply put, the physical separation of Patrol Operations on the east side of the building from the Detective Division on the west side introduced significant dysfunction into our operational capacity that requires much effort to address.
 - The current facility is not capable of integrating the Patrol Operations and Detective Divisions in a contiguous area with a co-located evidence facility.
6. Communications/Emergency Operations Center: A law enforcement facility must have a properly designed, equipped and functional emergency operations center (EOC) that affords situational awareness and technological access across department lines (police, fire, public works, finance, Town Manager, Town Council). Nominally, any EOC should be co-located with the Department's Communications Center (ComCenter) and Operational Elements to afford appropriate situational awareness and transfer of information, data as well as inter-department coordination.
- The Town has no specifically designed, purpose-built and properly equipped EOC that can be quickly activated and staffed to address a critical event in the Town. Currently, the Fire Department's (FDs) training room serves as the Town EOC with minimal technology and infrastructure.
 - The EOC in the FD training room is not co-located with our ComCenter which *significantly inhibits the acquisition and coordination of information and data during a critical event.* There is insufficient space in the current facility to build and properly equip a purpose-built EOC that is contiguous with the ComCenter and police operations elements.
7. Summary: ***The operational deficiencies caused by our current facility have compromised operational standards and best practices of the Department. The operational deficiencies have introduced significant inefficiencies into Department operations and compromise the mission of the Department as well as the safety and security of the public and our employees.***

III. Functional Deficiencies/Safety & Security:

- A. External Security: The most important element for any law enforcement facility today is to ensure the safety and security of the public, our employees and Town assets. As noted in Section I, above, the original use of the current facility was general office space; therefore, no safety or security elements except for perimeter security were incorporated into the footprint and facility. Apart from perimeter and interior door access control and minimal exterior and interior video surveillance, the current facility does not meet modern safety and security guidelines and as such compromises the public who use the facility along with the employees who work there.
1. Security Setback: Modern law enforcement facilities are designed with adequate “setback” distance from adjacent roads and public parking to ensure the integrity of the facility in the event of an inadvertent or intentional explosion.
 - The current facility lacks adequate setback protection as well as exterior window protection that compromises one of the most critical functions of the Department; the communications center (ComCenter). The ComCenter is located on the ground level and on an exterior wall with windows that imperils the integrity of the center and its employees. The loss of the ComCenter during an event would cripple the public safety functions of both Police and Fire Department. There is no option to correct this deficiency using the current facility.
 - The current facility sits astride the state’s primary east/west highway carrying more than 32,000 vehicles each 24-hour period including hazardous cargo. In the event of an accident in the locus of the facility that involved hazardous material/cargo, the safety complex would have to be evacuated, causing a *major disruption in public safety services during a critical event.*
 2. Exterior Perimeter Protection: All law enforcement facilities must have adequate perimeter security to protect the public, employees and Town assets (e.g. vehicles, impound area, infrastructure (e.g. emergency generation)).
 - Perimeter Fencing: The current facility lacks any perimeter security fencing and access control. Occasionally, unidentified citizens as well as recently released prisoners have been located in restricted areas. In one recent case, a recently released prisoner threw a brick that compromised the integrity of an exterior door on the west side of the facility used only by employees.
 - Police Department Assets including our Incident Command Vehicle is parked in the lot which is not secure and subject to vandalism or even theft and is exposed to the environment, which has negatively affected and compromised the expected length of service for this asset valued at more than \$175,000.
 - Police Department Cruisers with expensive electronics and firearms are parked in an unsecured parking lot; some of which is not under video surveillance.
 - Town Employees are unprotected especially at night when accessing personal vehicles in an unprotected parking lot.

- The entire perimeter of the facility is exposed to an intentional act to breach security by a vehicle or explosive device whereas properly protected facilities expose only a small fraction of the facility and the exposed area is non-critical.
- Town Employee's Vehicles are unprotected when parked in the public safety parking lot.
- Critical Emergency Infrastructure such as our emergency generator is unprotected and is easily accessed and compromised as well as our land mobile radio technology equipment, while fenced in, is inadequate inasmuch as no perimeter security and video surveillance affords sufficient protection.
- Sally Port Security is compromised by the total lack of perimeter security especially during nighttime operations when an intruder could easily breach security by secreting themselves in the parking lot and waiting for the sally port door to open.
- First Floor Exterior Windows are original and while grossly energy inefficient are easily breached. Moreover, critical operational elements such as the ComCenter and computer server facility have exterior windows that pose *a significant security risk to Department operations*.
- Exterior Video Surveillance: The outdated video surveillance system for the public safety complex is unreliable, is incapable of retaining an appropriate amount of data and does not provide surveillance to all essential exterior areas to properly protect the public and our employees. While this can be corrected with a new system at the current facility, if the police department was ever re-located, the cost to replicate the system at a new location would be prohibitive and duplicative.

B. Interior Safety/Security: Law enforcement facilities are unique in that they combine the inherent risk associated with law enforcement as a known target for those who believe they have been disenfranchised by the criminal justice system, the Department, or a member of the Department or who view law enforcement as a manifestation of government that poses a risk to their belief system with inherently community oriented services. As a result, specific design elements are incorporated into law enforcement facilities that mitigate the inherent risk associated with law enforcement as a "target" as well as the risks posed by subjects under arrest that exhibit violent tendencies and the community policing strategy of the Department. The current facility, as noted in Section II, fails to protect the public, sworn and civilian employees due to the inherent design of the facility including its lobby and separation of operational elements and inadequate detention, interview/interrogation facilities.

1. Lobby/Entrance: The current facility combines non-law enforcement entities with law enforcement operations; which compromises the security of the facility and employees due to the need to allow public access to non-law enforcement functions/departments.
 - Properly designed law enforcement facilities confine public access to the main entrance lobby/community meeting room area.

- Moreover, the current inner/outer lobby is insufficiently protected inasmuch as the inner lobby doors are general office grade glass units easily breached by a heavy projectile.
2. Interview/Interrogation: The current facility, as noted in Section II, requires subjects under arrest to be moved while in custody from the detention facility to an interview room in order to conduct a proper audio/video recorded interrogation.
 - There is no secure area within the booking/detention facility to afford a subject under arrest to consult with an attorney or to provide a facility to secure and interview a juvenile in custody separate from adults as required by law.
 3. Common Use Areas Compromised: The same common use walkways used by sworn and civilian employees and the public lobby are also used to move subjects in custody creating an unmitigated risk that cannot be solved using the current facility without substantial renovation.
 4. ComCenter: As noted above, the security of the ComCenter, a critical operational support element for both police and fire departments is compromised due to a design feature that fails to separate the Department's Records Section from the ComCenter because of the need for both elements to have a "public" window to serve citizen's needs during regular and after normal business hours.
 - Properly designed police station lobbies have public access via a secure "window" that is handicap accessible for both Records during normal business hours and ComCenter personnel for after business hours requests.
 - The current facility has no provision for a second public access window for Records. As noted above, the security of the ComCenter is compromised because it is located on an exterior wall instead of within the interior of the facility and it is further compromised by exterior windows.
 5. Administration: When the inner lobby of the police station is accessible by the public the Chief and Deputy Chief's Administrative Assistant is exposed without protection to the public via a non-secure public window.
 - Furthermore, while not a security element, there is no proper, inviting or comfortable waiting areas for the main lobby or for police administration.
 - While the security of the public window area for the Chief's Administrative Assistant can be corrected in the current facility, were the police department to relocate, the costly ballistic material would be worthless for general office use and the ballistic material could not be removed and re-used elsewhere.
 6. Ammunition Storage: Currently, the Department's stock of ammunition, which at times is rather substantial, is improperly stored within the facility.
 - A properly designed law enforcement facility provides for separate, environmentally controlled (temperature and humidity) and secure storage for

ammunition and stock weapons (which are currently stored in the evidence room contrary to accreditation standards and best practice, however, we have no secure alternative) with a proper blast/explosion relief and ventilation system to meet most code requirements.

7. Police Prosecutor: The Police Prosecutor, who frequently has the need to meet with subjects released from custody pending adjudication and their attorneys is required to conduct those meetings in his office, which is inadequate by size and requires these subjects to be brought under escort into the secured administrative section of the Department's west wing.
8. Video Surveillance: The common areas of the interior spaces of the facility should be under constant video surveillance; however, only select areas of the current facility are under surveillance and where it does exist it is inadequate. As noted above, this deficiency can be corrected in the current facility; however, if the police department was ever relocated, the system in place would exceed general office requirements.
9. Summary: *The insurmountable safety and security deficiencies in the current facility compromises the mission of the Department as well as the safety and security of the public, our employees and critical infrastructure and public safety assets.*

IV. Functional Deficiencies/Space Utilization & Capacity:

- A. Capacity: As noted in Section I, above, the Department occupies 8,942 sq. ft. of interior space; however, to function properly according to accepted architectural and best business practices a MINIMUM, 16,592 sq. ft. of interior space is REQUIRED. *This equates to a 7,650 square foot deficiency in the current facility without accounting for future expansion.* Thus, the Department is currently operating in essentially one-half the space required with no ability to expand to the *current* required minimum or to accommodate *future needs*. One of the critical and most costly mistakes made in the transition to the current facility was the failure to anticipate future needs. To remain in the current facility not only compromises the mission of the Department and is both inefficient and ineffective as well as posing a substantial and unmitigated risk to the safety and security of the public and our employees and assets, the current property is inadequate even if all Town departments were to vacate. The Department would remain astride Route 101 and, as noted above, poses a risk in the event of a serious collision in the area of the Department and especially one that involves hazardous cargo that would necessitate an evacuation.
 1. Office Space: In order to operate at maximum efficiency and effectiveness to extract the maximum utility from the investment of resources into the Department, employees must be afforded comfortable and adequate office/workspace that is conducive to their work.
 - **No office space anywhere in the current facility is adequate** for any of the employees as noted by the most recent architectural study. Some employees share

office space designed for one with another employee leaving no opportunity for safe social distancing.

- **No meeting space in the current facility meets the needs** of any of the Department's Divisions. There is insufficient secure meeting space to brief law enforcement operations and at times the media has attempted to breach operational security from the public lobby when the training room was pressed into use to conduct secure law enforcement meetings. Meeting space is required for each operational unit to conduct business while larger, multi-use, meeting space should be available for shared use. The Operations Support Division has no meeting space nor does the Detective Division. The Patrol Operations Division can use the space allocated for roll call except during operational roll call briefings.
 - Roll Call: The space used for roll call, which is where pre/post shift briefings occur is neither large enough or properly designed to accommodate the needs of the Patrol Operations Division supervisors and officers that use this space. Due to other space constraints, other equipment is stored/located in roll call, which causes interruptions to briefings. Roll call is also the location where pre and post shift mini training/briefings occur; therefore, this room is functional and operational specific. During the pandemic, roll call briefings were occurring in the sally port to maintain appropriate social distancing because the roll call room is too small.
- Interview/Interrogation: Notwithstanding the operational deficiencies noted above for interview/interrogations; the current space allocated for interview/interrogation is woefully inadequate and improperly located or is non-existent entirely.
- Public Waiting Area(s): The **public waiting areas are neither inviting or comfortable** and there is no separate waiting area for use by visitors wishing to meet with the chief, deputy chief or senior command staff. The current facility does not "communicate well" with the public it serves and sends the wrong message about the community's commitment to law enforcement.
 - The public entering our facility should be afforded secure, comfortable and inviting "one-stop shopping" from the main lobby for all police services (records, licensing, complaints, interviews) 24/7/365.
- Personnel are sharing office space adequate for only one employee and in the case of the Detective Division, multiple employees and their supervisor share one inadequate office space. Sensitive communications between officers, victims, witnesses, and suspects are compromised by using open space work areas. There is no healthy way to maintain social distancing in the detective's office.
- Common Use Workspace: Police officers share a common, open, area to work on more involved projects such as search and arrest warrants or to prepare extensive case investigations related to fatal accident reconstruction. Open space areas compromise the integrity of the work being done by personnel and it compromises the efficiency of personnel who are often interrupted by other personnel. Sensitive

communications between officers, victims, witnesses and suspects are compromised by using open space work areas.

2. Storage Areas: Any business requires strategically located storage areas for both routine as well as bulk items to allow for efficient access and use of stored items.
 - Bulk Storage: Purpose built bulk storage for non-evidentiary items is non-existent. The second floor of the FD space is fenced to store the Department's archives, which is inadequate despite a multi-year effort to destroy all non-essential documents and files. Moreover, archives are not stored in easily accessible and space efficient document file storage units that can be collapsed to save space. Other bulk items are stored in a fenced off area in the sally port, which is contrary to best practice and safety.
 - Weapons/Ammunition Storage: As noted above, separate environmentally controlled and secure bulk storage for weapons and ammunition is required, which does not exist in the current facility.
 - Janitorial/Cleaning Supplies: Currently, janitorial and cleaning supplies are kept in an anteroom accessed through the public men's room. This same room contains some technology elements, which should not be accessible by cleaning personnel or potentially breached from the public men's room.
 - Automotive Supplies: Spare tires and other associated automotive supplies are stored in the sally port; which as noted is contrary to safety and security.
 - Routine Office Supplies: The space allocated in one small room to serve the entire Department is both inadequate and it contains critical network switching gear, which should not be placed in routine storage. Some office supplies are stored in a restroom. There is no routine storage area for the Patrol Operations Division and ComCenter on the east side of the facility.
 - Operational Equipment Storage: There is no purpose built storage for operational equipment used by the Technical Accident Reconstruction Team, Operations Support Division (training gear, protective equipment for training, specialized clothing and quartermaster gear (issued equipment); spare portable radios/chargers/batteries; or for the Patrol Operations Division which includes storage for spare flashlights, Tasers, weapons, batteries and miscellaneous operational equipment and consumables that is scattered throughout the Department.
- B. Training Facility: One of the key elements necessary to accomplish the Department's mission and to *assure appropriate mitigation of risk for the Town* is the requirement for appropriate training facilities. This is one functional deficiency that does not exist at all in the current facility. The Bedford Police Department *has no purpose-built training facility* except a training/meeting room.
 - Multi-Purpose Training Room: A modern law enforcement agency should be equipped with a multi-purpose room designed and built to serve many purposes; a community meeting room; classroom for law enforcement instruction with embedded

technology; media briefing; defensive tactics training that includes special flooring and wall covering that remains concealed until needed for such a purpose. Currently defensive tactics training is conducted in the training room, which does not afford the ability to conduct proper and *safe* training. Given recent events, we expect defensive tactics training will receive special attention and focus in the coming months including state-mandated requirement akin to firearms training/qualification.

- The current training room is too small to accommodate Department sponsored training activities. The Department cannot participate in hosting training seminars/classes that would allow the Department to receive free training for our employees for hosting the event due to the size of the room.
- Community Meetings: The Department is unable to host any significant size community meetings due to the small size of the training room forcing us to use and sometimes rent external facilities (e.g. Manchester Community Church, etc.).
- Workout/Fitness Facility: A well-equipped and maintained fitness facility is highly desired by law enforcement employees, sworn and civilian. Currently, Department employees share a limited fitness facility with the FD.
- Firearms Training: The Department has used Pointer's Fish & Game for decades to conduct firearms training. However, the increased frequency of firearms training requirements, tactical training requirements, reduced light training requirements; and the reduced scheduling opportunities afforded by Pointer's negatively affects our firearms training and qualification program.
 - Remedial Firearms Training for members is often conducted at an indoor firing range at a cost to the Department during winter months. Due to the scheduling and cost factors involved and supervision requirements at the indoor range, remedial training is not conducted as often as it should.
 - Winter Months: The NH Police Academy classes begin in January, May, and August; as a result, on several occasions when hiring a new employee in December we are often required to use a private, fee-based, indoor range for firearms training and qualification before the employee begins academy instruction. Due to the lack of a training facility, remedial and in-service firearms training does not occur in the late fall or winter months.
 - Modern Police Facilities Incorporate Indoor Firearms Training Facilities: The solution to the problems associated with liability and availability of external, private, firearms training facilities is solved by the installation of a small, five (5) point indoor firearms training facility within a new police facility. Advancements in clean ammunition as well as air purification/filtering makes this solution cost effective and more importantly advances the opportunities for continued and improved firearms training all year under Department controlled conditions.
 - Firearms Maintenance/Cleaning: There is no proper space provided for weapons maintenance/cleaning. Personnel that choose to clean/maintain issued weapons have a limited space in the sally-port; however, it is not properly ventilated, safe or secure for weapons maintenance.

- C. Administrative Document File Storage/Space Utilization: While the Department moved to a largely “paperless” environment several years ago, the document requirements mandated by NH RSAs and the Department of Safety requires the retention of specific case and administrative files, sometimes for indefinite periods (e.g. arrest records). When “hard” copies are mandated by law for retention, an efficient filing system is required to maximize space utilization and efficient access. The current facility provides neither.
- Archives: As noted above, the Department recently completed a multi-year effort to destroy documents in archives no longer required by law. Despite that effort, significant paper files remain and occupy space on the second floor of the public safety complex combined with general storage used by the FD. The only security afforded Department archives is wire fencing. The documents are in boxes on shelving which consumes significant space and makes the documents difficult to locate and access. The area is not properly climate controlled, which results in degradation of the documents and containers.
 - A properly designed file/records area places these files in a collapsible, rolling, filing system that maximizes space utilization as well as making the documents easily found and accessible. Department archives and files are currently scattered between the second floor fenced off area and stacked in an over-crowded office used by the prosecutor’s secretary. Neither the prosecutor’s secretary or records clerks or other authorized employees have easy and efficient access to files.
 - Personnel and Internal Affairs Files: Sensitive personnel files and internal affairs files are located in the Deputy Chief’s office and the office used by the Lieutenant, Operations Support Division and are not properly secured. Moreover, we are over capacity for these files. Locating and maintaining these files is much more difficult and time consuming than necessary inhibiting the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration of the Department.
 - Administrative Files: The files related to the administration of the Department kept by the Chief’s secretary, which includes financial, time and attendance and other files are maintained in the confined space used by the Chief’s secretary, which is over capacity as well. Due to the restricted space afforded in the current facility, an upgrade to the administrative filing system has been delayed.
- D. Vehicle/Asset Storage & Protection: The Department’s fleet is one of the most valuable and costly assets. Our rolling stock ranges from our Incident Command Vehicle (valued at \$175,000; purchased with drug asset forfeiture funds), SUV mini-command vehicle used by our patrol supervisors, undercover vehicle(s), cruisers, motorcycle and mountain bicycles. Except for our Harley-Davidson motorcycle and bicycles, all our rolling stock is stored outdoors exposed to the elements. While vehicles are designed to be stored outside, our vehicles are different because of their contents; packed with technology from mobile data terminals, cradle-point hot-spots, land mobile radios, printers and rifles as well as AEDs, medical supplies, tactical vests and other items these units are “rolling offices.” While much of the equipment in our cruisers is ruggedized that alone does not guarantee

exposure to excessive heat/cold and moisture does not adversely affect even ruggedized equipment.

- Incident Command Vehicle: This specially designed and equipped vehicle used on many occasions at crime and accident scenes and special events is a “rolling police station” and, in fact, is designed as such to serve as a back-up ComCenter if necessary with emergency generation, power supplies, and external video surveillance all of which along with the chassis is exposed to the elements. We desire to have this vehicle in service for 20-years, but the toll taken on the chassis and other accessories will shorten its service life by at least 25%. We have been required to replace the units six tires with only 10% use due to dry-rot exposure to the sun. On many occasions, after a snow/ice event the vehicle is buried and “iced” to the extent its external video equipment is unusable until the vehicle is placed in a heated facility diminishing its public safety utilization to be ready at a moment’s notice under any conditions.
- Cruisers: Some of our vehicles can be placed under a “overhang” which affords some limited protection from rain/snow; but this is not climate controlled. Therefore, all our cruisers are “cold or heat-soaked” on occasion including the technology contained therein. The equipment is also exposed to sun and humidity which degrade digital equipment usefulness and operational life and efficiency. Newer SUV cruisers will not fit inside the cruiser carport due to support columns.

E. Employee Amenities: A highly competitive job-market with a diminishing pool of qualified candidates for sworn and civilian positions in law enforcement brings into focus the amenities afforded employees in the workplace that makes one agency or department more attractive than competitors even those with more lucrative compensation benefits. When computed and factored against compensation costs, employee amenities in the workplace are much more cost effective. The current facility provides little to no employee amenities that make the workplace inviting, comfortable, efficient or effective. The most recent “crop” of new employees places greater emphasis on employee amenities in the workplace than their predecessors.

- Breakroom(s): The current facility has one very small area, large enough for only one employee to sit; to enjoy a break from the daily routine. As such, it is rarely used; instead, food is often consumed at one’s desk or in roll call or in a cruiser. ComCenter employees are required to leave the secure center to take meals and breaks, whereas a small breakroom specifically for ComCenter employees contiguous to the center is desirable for efficiency, effectiveness and employee satisfaction. It is unusual for a Department our size to not provide a warm, inviting, equipped and usable breakroom to have a meal with colleagues or visitors and is a significant gap for employees. Food donations are often placed in roll call or in the training room; neither of which are appropriate locations for meal consumption nor breaks. Additionally, a breakroom should be an inviting location to relax and recoup from a difficult call, case or encounter.
- Restroom Facilities: The current facility provides no private restroom facilities for Patrol Operations Division personnel on the east side of the building. To access a restroom from the Patrol Operations Division side the employee has the option to use

the public restroom in the lobby or the locker room facility on the second floor or bypass the public restroom to use the facilities in the west side of the building. Use of a restroom by law enforcement personnel equipped with a firearm, taser, and other equipment is challenging and should be in a secure restroom facility. There are many occasions when a restroom is not immediately available. Moreover, the ventilation and air exchange in the public and west-wing facilities is inadequate. There is a unisex bathroom in the ComCenter which doubles as a locker room for ComCenter employees; however, for security purposes this facility is only accessible by ComCenter employees. Restrooms must be strategically located for all employees near their workspaces, which is not the case now. Shower facilities are shared with the FD on the second floor.

- **Locker Room Facilities:** Locker rooms for law enforcement employees must be secure since issued weapons and personally owned weapons are temporarily stored there. The current facility affords insufficient locker space and lockers for all employees in the locker room, which is located on the second floor and not easily accessible to employees of any division of the Department. Due to the lack of lockers and space, the Chief, Deputy Chief, Captain, Lieutenants and Sergeants do not have lockers, which are reserved for Patrol Operations employees. The sergeant's office has individual cabinets used by sergeants as lockers, but the room is also used as an office and thus there is no male/female separation. Detectives have cabinets in a small area crafted adjacent to a conference room, but the space is extremely small and is not designed for male/female separation. Now that we are at full strength, we have no lockers for the newer employees.

F. **Public Amenities:** Most importantly, as noted in Section I, the police station, especially in today's charged climate must be inviting and a reflection of the community's interest and investment in public safety. It should be equipped with public meeting space in a multi-purpose room that can be expanded/collapsed based upon need and function; equipped with technology that facilitates professional presentations, briefings, meetings and events. The police station's lobby must be warm, functional, modern, bright yet affording appropriate security and privacy for the public and employees.

- The current facility lobby is neither inviting, warm or an adequate reflection of the community's investment in public safety. Make-shift tables with inadequate space to properly display material of interest to the public and a hard, wooden, bench is what greets our visitors. Our "public" window is not handicapped accessible or friendly. The inner lobby is not much more inviting than the outer lobby with only a few plastic chairs.
- **Public Meeting Room:** In the current facility, the public meeting room is adjacent to the chief's office; therefore, when large groups use the room the noise from the group disrupts operations in the administrative section of the Department. The required secondary fire exit from the meeting room is located between the chief and deputy chief's offices.
- **Parking:** The space allocated for Town assets, employee and public parking is woefully inadequate. A plan developed by DPW will improve parking, but it will not provide

sufficient parking to accommodate large meetings at the same time all Departments on site are at full operating capacity.

- Handicap Compliant: Many locations within the current facility are not handicap compliant or friendly.

V. Executive Summary:

- A. Operational Deficiencies: The record is replete with numerous deficiencies that impede the ability of the Department to fulfill its mission and which, severely impacts the efficiency and effectiveness of our operations. Operational deficiencies **compromise** the **safety** of the public as well as our employees and those in our custody. These deficiencies also **compromise** the integrity of our **investigations** and thus affect the core law enforcement mission of the Department. Many of the operational deficiencies especially those related to evidence, booking/detention; prisoner detention, interview/interrogation **impede** our ability to attain **accreditation** and **cannot be corrected using the current facility or footprint going forward.**
- B. Functional Deficiencies: The record is also clear based upon recognized industry standards that our Department is shoe-horned into space one-half the size required to operate *at current strength.* The strategic errors made during the initial conversion of general office space into a law enforcement facility cannot be corrected without massive and expensive redesign and rebuilding, which is predicated upon the elimination of all other Town departments from the site. Remaining at our present location continues to expose the Department to the hazards and risk associated with co-location along Route 101 despite its central location. The functional layout of the current facility has led to massive inefficiencies caused by workflow disruptions that compromise the effectiveness of the Department. The integrity and security of confidential administrative files is compromised. There are minimal public amenities and virtually no employee amenities by modern standards and there is no properly equipped and protected emergency operations center. Our ComCenter security and integrity is compromised and we don't even have enough bathrooms and locker space for all our employees. Whatever competitive edge we have in terms of personnel and equipment is vastly diminished if not entirely offset by the facility we occupy. We suffer increased cost, liability, risk and most importantly diminished public and employee safety and satisfaction.